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CASE NOTES
Evidence-LIMITATION ON THE FEDERAL HUSBAND-WIFE EVIDEN-
TIARY PRIVILEGE-Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980).
In 1958 the United States Supreme Court in Hawkins v. United
States' was presented with the opportunity to do away with the
federal evidentiary privilege prohibiting one spouse from testifying
against the other without the consent of the defendant spouse. In
the federal courts before 1958, the privilege had been applicable
only in criminal trials where "life or liberty is at stake."' At the
time Hawkins was decided a number of states had modified the
"anti-marital facts"3 privilege or abolished it altogether.4 In addi-
tion, several authorities on the law of evidence had criticized the
rule extensively. For example, in 1923 Professor Wigmore found
the "privilege has no longer any good reason for retention,"' and at
1. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
2. Id. at 77. It seems to have been generally understood that the privilege was available
only in criminal trials. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), was a case up-
holding contempt citations against husband and wife taxpayers for their refusal, based
partly on the marital testimonial privilege, to answer interrogatories propounded by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Seventh Circuit, while noting it was "not necessary
to fully defend the civil-criminal distinction in order to reject the marital privilege in this
case," observed "that the privilege has the greatest societal value in criminal cases because
it encourages the preservation of a marriage that might assist the defendant spouse in his or
her rehabilitation efforts. . . .This rationale would not be applicable in a civil case." 568
F.2d at 544 (citations omitted).
3. In United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977), the court noted that this
marital testimonial privilege is often referred to as the anti-marital facts privilege.
4. See Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906, 910 (1980).
5. See, e.g., 4 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2228 (2d ed. 1923); C. MCCORMICK,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 83 (1st ed. 1954). McCormick argued: "All extensions [of the marital
privilege] beyond communications seem unjustified. The acts thus protected are frequently
acts done in furtherance of a crime or fraud, and thus under the principle developed for the
cognate privilege for attorney client communications, should not be protected from disclo-
sure even by direct communication." Id. at 171 (footnotes omitted).
6. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228 at 761. Wigmore also noted:
The record of judicial ratiocination defining the grounds and policy of this privi-
lege forms one of the most curious and entertaining chapters of the law of Evi-
dence. It is curious, because the variety of ingenuity displayed, in the invention of
reasons "ex post facto," for a rule so simple and so long acccepted, could hardly
have been believed, but for the recorded utterances. It is entertaining (if any error
in the law can ever be entertaining), because of its exhibition of the subtle power
of cant over reason, and of the solemn absurdity of explanations which do not
explain and of justifications which do not justify, and because of the fantastic
spectacle of a fundamental rule of Evidence, which never had a good reason for
existence, surviving none the less through two centuries upon the strength of cer-
tain artificial dogmas-pronouncements wholly irreconcilable with each other,
with the facts of life, and with the rule itself, and yet repeatedly invoked; with
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least as early as 1954, Professor McCormick pointed out that the
"real source of the privilege" was "emotion and sentiment" and
"this motive ... while worthy and desirable, will not stand in the
balance with the need for disclosure in court of the facts upon
which a man's life, liberty, or estate may depend."'7
The Court in Hawkins declined the opportunity to change this
"exclusionary rule based on the persistent instincts of several cen-
turies,"8 expressing its concern that the privilege was still neces-
sary for the preservation of "family peace, not only for the benefit
of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as
well."9 The Court pointed to the "widespread success achieved by
courts throughout the country in conciliating family differences"
and its belief that adverse testimony given without the consent of
the defendant spouse would destroy marriages that might other-
wise be saved. 10
The Government had urged modification of the rule so that the
privilege would belong to the witness spouse rather than the defen-
dant spouse. Under this version of the privilege, one spouse would
be permitted to testify voluntarily against the other spouse with-
out the consent of the defendant spouse, although the
smug judicial positiveness, like magic formulas, to still the spectre of forensic
doubt. No one of these supposed reasons was ever logically carried out in the en-
forcing of the rule; no one of them represented a sound cause for its existence; and
no one of them, in all probability, reproduced the motives or sentiments which
actually served for the original acceptance of the rule in the 1500s.
Id. at 753.
7. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 90 at 179-80. McCormick's complete statement was:
All of us have a feeling of indelicacy and want of decorum in prying into the
secrets of husband and wife. It is important to recognize that this is the real
source of the privilege. When we do, we realize at once that this motive of deli-
cacy, while worthy and desirable, will not stand in the balance with the need for
disclosure in court of the facts upon which a man's life, liberty, or estate may
depend.
Id. Dealing in terms of both the testimonial and confidential communications privileges,
McCormick offered a solution to the problem which has in a sense been adopted by the
federal courts since Hawkins:
This solution is to recognize, by statute, rule of court or decision, that the privi-
lege is not an absolute but a qualified one, which must yield if the trial judge finds
that the evidence of the communication is required in the due administration of
justice. The judge could then protect the marital confidence when it should be
protected, namely, when the material fact sought to be established by the commu-
nication is not substantially controverted and may be proven with reasonable con-
venience by other evidence.
Id. at 180 (footnote omitted).
8. 358 U.S. at 79.
9. Id. at 77.
10. Id. at 77-78.
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nondefendant could not be compelled to testify. The Court noted
the absence of case authority to support "such a distinction be-
tween compelled and voluntary testimony,"" however, and based
its rejection of the recommended rule on contemporary reason and
experience, given the underlying goal of preserving domestic har-
mony.1 2 Lastly, the Court assigned further consideration of the
rule and any desirable changes to Congress or future decisional
law, leaving an avenue open for "whatever changes in the rule may
eventually be dictated by 'reason and experience.' "3
Twenty-two years later, accompanied by considerable press at-
tention,"' the Court decided Trammel v. United States.'6 The
Trammel Court unanimously affirmed the Tenth Circuit's refusal
to follow Hawkins and thereby rejected the anti-marital facts priv-
ilege.' 6 The ruling was based on a reconsideration of essentially the
same arguments presented by the Government in Hawkins, a cir-
11. Id. at 77.
12. Id. In rebutting the Government's argument, the Court noted:
The widespread success achieved by courts throughout the country in conciliating
family differences is a real indication that some apparently broken homes can be
saved provided no unforgivable act is done by either party. Adverse testimony
given in criminal proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any
marriage.
Id. at 77-78.
13. Id. at 78-79. The Court cited the then limited nature of statutory and case law ex-
ceptions to the rule in support of its contention that "there is still a widespread belief,
grounded on present conditions, that the law should not force or encourage testimony which
might alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences." Id. at 79.
The only statutory exceptions available were in prosecutions for bigamy, polygamy or un-
lawful cohabitation, and for the importation of aliens for immoral purposes. Id. at 78 (citing
Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880); Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 278,
66 Stat. 230 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (1976)); Act of March 3, 1887, ch.
397, § 1, 24 Stat. 635 (1887) (repealed 1948)). Case law had evolved to the point where a
witness spouse could testify against a defendant spouse when the witness spouse had been
the victim of the offense against the person of his wife. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 221
(1839). Although the rule in its original form prohibited a spouse from testifying for as well
as against the other spouse regardless of consent, with Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1933), spouses were able to testify favorably for one another; the incompetency rationale
founded in the theory that husband and wife were one, was flatly rejected. Id. at 381. The
ability to offer adverse testimony would seem to follow from the recognition of spouses as
competent witnesses, but this was qualified to require consent of the spouse to be testified
against. See Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 78.
14. Regional newspapers carried stories on the decision. See, e.g., Atlanta Constitution,
Feb. 28, 1980, § A at 1, col. 4; Miami Herald, Feb. 28, 1980, § A at 1, col. 3; Wermiel,
Supreme Court Decides That One Spouse Can Testify Voluntarily Against Other, Wall St.
J., Feb. 28, 1980, at 19, col. 2.
15. 100 S. Ct. 906, 914 (1980).
16. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978), affd, 100 S. Ct. 906
(1980).
322 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:319
cumstance the Court seemed to acknowledge in its analysis.17 De-
spite Justice Stewart's criticism in his concurring opinion of the
manner in which the decision was explained,18 few would argue
with the result reached by the Court. The Court used this opportu-
nity to rid the federal judicial system of an outdated and increas-
ingly cumbersome rule. Apparently the instincts of the Court in
1980 finally eclipsed the "persistent instincts of several
centuries." 9
The evidentiary privilege question was presented in slightly dif-
fering factual contexts in Hawkins and Trammel, although each
situation involved a degree of participation by the witness spouse
in the criminal activity of the defendant spouse.
Hawkins was a prosecution under the Mann Act.20 The defen-
dant was charged with transportation of a seventeen-year-old girl
from Arkansas to Oklahoma for immoral purposes.2' The defen-
dant's prostitute wife, whose testimony the court viewed as "a
strong suggestion to the jury that petitioner was probably the kind
of man to whom such a purpose would have been perfectly natu-
ral, '2  participated in the acts culminating in criminal charges
against her husband to the "extent of giving the illegally trans-
ported girl advice on trade practices. She also travelled with the
girl in an automobile owned by the defendant's wife from
Oklahoma back to Arkansas where they rejoined the defendant.28
Testimony given by the defendant's wife against her husband con-
stituted the grounds for reversal.2 '
17. See Trammel, 100 S. Ct. at 909-12.
18. Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
Although agreeing with much of what the Court has to say, I cannot join an opin-
ion that implies that "reason and experience" have worked a vast change since the
Hawkins case was decided in 1958 ...
The fact of the matter is that the Court in this case simply accepts the very
same arguments that the Court rejected when the Government first made them in
the Hawkins case in 1958.
100 S. Ct. at 914 (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. 358 U.S. at 79.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1976). This act provides punishment for those who transport or aid
in the transportation of a female in interstate or foreign commerce or in the District of
Columbia or in any territory or possession of the United States for the purpose of prostitu-
tion, debauchery, or for any immoral purpose, or to induce the female to partake in these
activities.
21. Hawkins v. United States, 249 F.2d 735, 736 (10th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 358 U.S. 74
(1958). The complete facts are set forth in 249 F.2d at 737.
22. 358 U.S. at 81.
23. 249 F.2d at 737.
24. 358 U.S. at 74.
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. In Trammel, Otis Trammel was one of three defendants charged
with conspiracy to import heroin.2 5 Elizabeth Trammel, Otis's wife,
was an unindicted co-conspirator who agreed to testify against the
charged defendants in return for an assurance that her testimony
-would not be used against her and for a guarantee of lenient treat-
ment. The indictment alleged Mr. and Mrs. Trammel had flown to
the Philippines with some heroin. From there, Mrs. Trammel pro-
ceeded to Thailand and bought more heroin, which was discovered
in her possession upon her arrival in Hawaii. Mrs. Trammel subse-
quently agreed to cooperate with government officials.
The Trammel Court acknowledged the sensitive nature of the
issue, but suggested that visible changes had taken place since
1958 which justified the abandonment of the anti-marital facts
privilege when it said:
Although Rule 501 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] confirms
the authority of the federal courts to reconsider the continued va-
lidity of the Hawkins rule, the long history of the privilege sug-
gests that it ought not to be casually cast aside. That the privilege
is one affecting marriage, home, and family relation-
ships-already subject to much erosion in our day-also counsels
caution. At the same time we cannot escape the reality that the
law on occasion adheres to doctrinal concepts long after the rea-
sons which gave them birth have disappeared and after experi-
ence suggests the need for change. 26
Eventually the Court concluded that "'reason and experience' no
longer justify so sweeping a rule as that found acceptable by the
Court in Hawkins. ' 27 If the Court could have further explicated
the experience to which it alluded rather than merely reiterating
the arguments made in Hawkins, perhaps the Court's decision
would be more informative. The erosion of policy-based rules, how-
ever, seems to be a process insusceptible to precise documentation.
Given the myriad exceptions to Hawkins promulgated over the last
twenty-two years, the Court has responded, if instinctively, to the
clear demonstration of "the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule."28
Two separate marital privileges have long been recognized in the
federal courts: (1) the marital privilege protecting confidential
communications, similar in scope to other special relationship evi-
25. The facts are set forth in Trammel, 100 S. Ct. at 908-09.
26. Id. at 911.
27. Id. at 914.
28. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
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dentiary privileges, and (2) the ban on adverse testimony without
the consent of defendant spouse, labelled the "anti-marital facts"
privilege.2 9 The first privilege, regarding confidential communica-
tions, allows one spouse to prevent the other from testifying as to
"intra-spousal, confidential expressions arising from the marital re-
lationship.""0 Either the testifying spouse or the defendant spouse
may assert this privilege. In this respect it is unlike the anti-mari-
tal facts privilege. After Trammel the confidential communica-
tions privilege remains fully intact, but certain requirements must
be met in order to claim it. Most obviously, common sense and the
cases indicate that in order to claim the privilege, a valid marriage
must have existed when the communication was made.8 To be
privileged, moreover, the communications must have been "utter-
ances or expressions intended by one spouse to convey a message
to the other. '33 An expression or communication does not become
privileged solely because one spouse made the expression in the
presence of the other.34 The husband and wife must have intended
the communication to be confidential. Therefore, it must not have
occurred in the presence of third persons.35 Those claiming the
privilege must have been communicating in their roles as spouses 6
and not, for example, as business partners. The communicating
spouse alone, however, may consent to the revelation of the com-
munications.3 7 Courts have held that to prevent waiver the com-
municating spouse must continuously assert the privilege,8 8 and
that the privilege is not applicable to intraspousal communications
made in the process of joint commission of a crime.3 9 The privilege
29. See United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th
Cir. 1975). See also Annot., 46 A.L.R. Fed. 735, 739 (1980).
30. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977).
31. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 169-70 (2d ed. 1972).
32. Id. For cases on the marital privilege regarding confidential communications see An-
not., 46 A.L.R. Fed. 735, 756-59 (1980).
33. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 748 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954)).
34. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 748 n.13 (9th Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 748; Wolfie v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
36. United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d
835 (1949)).
37. Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 144 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 849
(1945).
38. United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1972).
39. United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1380 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988
(1978).
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only applies to communications occurring during the marriage,40
but unlike the anti-marital facts privilege, the protection afforded
confidential communications continues to apply even after the ter-
mination of the marriage.41
The early common law justification for the anti-marital facts
privilege, which barred spouses from testifying in favor of or
against one another in civil or criminal proceedings, was the theory
that husband and wife constituted one unit and thus, were pre-
cluded by self-interest from testifying concerning each other.42 For
this reason, a spouse was viewed as incompetent to testify either
for or against the other spouse. In Funk v. United States,43 the
Court abandoned the self-interest theory and qualified the abso-
lute bar on spousal testimony by making spouses competent to tes-
tify in favor of one another. The Trammel Court further modified
the privilege so that a willing spouse is now competent to testify
against as well as in favor of the other spouse.
ANALYSIS OF Trammel
The Trammel Court began by noting the further erosion of the
anti-marital facts privilege among the various jurisdictions." In
Hawkins the Court had observed "most American States retain the
rule, though many provide exceptions in some classes of cases.' 45
Apparently thirty-one of fifty states retained the rule at the time
Hawkins was decided, whereas presently only twenty-four states
allow the anti-marital facts privilege.4'6 The steady trend of states
abandoning the rule is notable as an expression of continuing dis-
40. United States v. Pensinger, 549 F.2d 1150, 1151 (8th Cir. 1977).
41. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977).
42. 358 U.S. at 75. See also United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977).
43. 290 U.S. 371 (1933). When Funk was decided, "Widespread disqualifications because
of interest ... had long since been abolished both in this country and in England in accor-
dance with the modern trend which permitted interested witnesses to testify and left it for
the jury to assess their credibility." 358 U.S. at 76. See also United States v. Fisher, 518
F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1975) (the Second Circuit ruled that since the defendant's marriage
had little chance of survival, there was no reason to involve the anti-marital facts privilege).
44. 100 S. Ct. at 911-12.
45. 358 U.S. at 78 (footnote omitted).
46. 100 S. Ct. at 911-12 n.9. Florida is one of the states cited as having abolished the
privilege in criminal cases. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.501, .504 (1979), became effective July 1, 1979,
as part of the newly adopted Florida Evidence Code. It should be noted, however, that the
privilege did not exist in Florida's statutes prior to the adoption of the Florida Evidence
Code. See ch. 4029, 1891 Fla. Laws 56 (repealed 1978); ch. 70-339, § 100, 1970 Fla. Laws
1038 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 914.07 (1979)).
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approval, even though nearly half the states retain it yet.47
Continued scholarly criticism is cited in Trammel as a second
reason for abandoning Hawkins.48 A number of articles criticizing
the result in Hawkins have been written since 1958; a rash of criti-
cal comments appeared immediately after Hawkins and sporadic
calls for abandonment of the anti-marital facts privilege have ap-
peared since.49 In 1976, a commentator advocated a case-by-case
approach to adverse spousal testimony, claiming, "the marital priv-
ilege, in its modern context, serves little or no purpose in the ma-
jority of cases other than to obstruct the discovery of truth.""
In further support of Trammel's rejection of the common law
rule, the Court in Trammel noted the broad sweep of the anti-
marital facts privilege, which prohibited all adverse spousal testi-
mony. Other evidentiary privileges protect only matters within a
defined scope, such as confidential communications within the at-
torney-client privilege.81 The broader marital testimonial privilege
47. 100 S. Ct. at 911-12.
48. Id. at 912 & n.11.
49. See, e.g., 45 CORNELL L. Q. 121, 124 (1959). More recently, see Comment, The Hus-
band-Wife Evidentiary Privileges: Is Marriage Really Necessary? 1977 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 411,
429-33 (1977); Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a
Modern World, 7 CuM. L. REV. 307, 318-21 (1976).
50. Comment, 7 CuM. L. REV, supra note 49, at 322.
51. The Court specifically noted:
The privileges between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and
patient limit protection to private communications. These privileges are rooted in
the imperative need for confidence and trust. The priest-penitent privilege recog-
nizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return. The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need
for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for
seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out. Similarly,
the physician must know all that a patient can articulate in order to identify and
to treat disease; barriers to full disclosure would impair diagnosis and treatment.
The Hawkins rule stands in marked contrast to these three privileges. Its pro-
tection is not limited to confidential communications; rather it permits an accused
to exclude all adverse spousal testimony.
100 S. Ct. at 913.
Even the more limited privileges are subject to attack, and it is said that evidentiary
privileges in general are to be "narrowly construed because they block the judicial fact-
finding function." Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1977). See also United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974) (the Court noted the need for all relevant facts
in rejecting Nixon's contention of an absolute executive privilege). In United States v. Men-
doza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1380 (5th Cir. 1978), the court observed "the call for the curtailment of
both aspects of the [marital] privilege has risen from many quarters," and cited McCoRMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 79 at 165 (2d ed. 1972):
[All privileges, in general, and this privilege for marital confidences, in particular,
are inept and clumsy devices to promote the policies they profess to serve, but are
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is not therefore necessary to protect confidential communications
between married persons; a second distinct privilege exists to pro-
tect them and it still remains in effect.5 2 This is an extremely im-
portant point, the significance of which was underemphasized in
the press coverage of the Trammel decision. Trammel has merely
modified the anti-marital facts privilege to allow the policy favor-
ing full disclosure to dominate when truth and intimacy conflict.
An unwilling spouse may still refuse to testify against the other
spouse, and even a spouse who undertakes to testify adversely may
not disclose communications made by the defendant spouse within
the confidential marital relationship.53
The Trammel Court's reference to the ancient foundations of
the testimonial privilege was bound to draw attention." The obser-
vation that women are no longer viewed as chattels without sepa-
rate legal identities had been made previously by the Coit." Al-
though this observation appeals to contemporary sentiments
regarding the status of women, it merely states the legally obvious
and fails to disclose the reasons for the change of opinion between
Hawkins and Trammel.
Finally, the Trammel Court refers to the "unpersuasiveness" to
contemporary understanding of the reasoning traditionally used to
support the anti-marital facts rule.56 The best explanation for
abandoning the rule would seem to rest in this transformation of
values. The Court, however, did not elaborate on precisely why the
rationale of preserving family peace and harmony was persuasive
in 1958, but specious in 1980. This lack of discussion is due in part
to earlier justification of the anti-marital facts privilege based di-
rectly upon public policy grounds and an older consensus of feel-
ings of "natural repugnance . . . to compelling a wife or husband
extremely effective as stumbling blocks to obstruct the attainment of justice. Ac-
cordingly the movement should be toward restriction, and not toward expansion,
of these . ..relevant facts.
52. 100 S. Ct. at 912-13.
53. 100 S. Ct. at 912-14. See Mills v. United States, 281 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1960)
(the Fourth Circuit ruled that the trial court acted properly in refusing to compel a woman
to testify either for or against her husband); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th
Cir. 1977) (the Ninth Circuit noted that the confidential communications privilege bars all
testimony concerning confidential, intraspousal communications arising from the marital
relationship).
54. The Trammel Court noted that "The ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege
have long since disappeared." 100 S. Ct. at 913.
55. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533-37 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
14-15 (1975).
56. 100 S. Ct. at 913.
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to be the means of the other's condemnation. '57 Because these
concepts are matters of convention rather than exact definition, it
is especially difficult to pinpoint changes in the underlying senti-
ment which required modification of the rule. The legal manifesta-
tion of these changes in popular attitude which led to the result in
Trammel, however, is the proliferation of exceptions to Hawkins in
the federal courts during the twenty-two year interim.58 Prior to its
reconsideration of Hawkins, case law had reached the point where
the anti-marital facts privilege had become so complex and subject
to such narrow interpretation as to leave the Hawkins rule virtu-
ally unavailable in some circuits. Prior to the Supreme Court's re-
versal of Hawkins, the Tenth Circuit should not have stated that it
had been established that the testimonial privilege belonged to the
witness spouse59 because it thereby implied, contrary to Hawkins,
that the witness spouse alone could decide to testify. The Tenth
Circuit might have avoided conflict with Hawkins by applying an
exception to the Hawkins rule which prevents use of the privilege
when both spouses participate in the crime. Such a ruling, how-
ever, would have added a new twist to an already complex group of
exceptions because then the witness spouse could have asserted her
rights under the fifth amendment.60 Outright abandonment of the
rule was timely in 1980, in light of this mounting complexity.
PosT-Hawkins DEVELOPMENTS
In addition to the multitude of reasons recited by the Court for
its decision, a study of post-Hawkins lower federal court cases in-
volving the anti-marital facts privilege provides added insight to
the Trammel decision. Since Hawkins, lower federal courts have
recognized and created numerous exceptions to the privilege.
These exceptions supplement the early statutory and judicial ex-
ceptions which allowed one spouse to testify without the consent of
the other when the defendant spouse was being prosecuted for big-
amy, polygamy, unlawful cohabitation, the transportation of aliens
for immoral purposes, or a crime against the person of the testify-
57. J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228 at 756.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975) (privilege not applica-
ble when spouse is victim of the crime charged; including fraud, adultery, and subjection to
possible criminal prosecution); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974) (wife permitted to testify against her husband without his
consent as both had participated in the crime).
59. Trammel, 583 F.2d at 1169.
60. See id.
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ing spouse."' For example, the participation of both spouses in the
crime charged creates a bar to the testimonial privilege.62 The
Eighth Circuit noted that the scope of the exception for a spouse
who has been a victim of the crime was expanded by the inclusion
of fraud, adultery, and subjection to possible criminal prosecution
within the definition of an offense against the spouse." The court
in United States v. Allery further stated that many jurisdictions
had passed laws creating an exception for cases in which children
are abused or neglected. 4
After the decision in Hawkins, the circuits differed as to whether
third parties could testify to out-of-court statements made by one
spouse against the other,6 5 or whether tape recordings of out-of-
court conversations of a spouse were admissible.66 Because the
privilege, which is grounded in policy and is not of constitutional
dimension,67 could be waived, questions also arose as to whether a
spouse's consent to favorable testimony also constituted consent to
adverse testimony.68
Between Hawkins and Trammel the federal courts seemed to
adopt a case-by-case approach to the anti-marital facts privilege.
61. See note 13 supra.
62. In United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974), a wife was permitted
to testify without consent against her husband, with whom she had participated in violating
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1976) which prohibits the transportation of illegal aliens. The Seventh
Circuit noted that Hawkins could be a barrier to allowing such testimony, determining that
if the Hawkins case were "treated as involving a joint criminal venture by the spouses, then
the Supreme Court has held sub silentio that the privilege against spousal testimony applies
in such a case." Id. at 1397 (emphasis in original). The court went on to say, however, that
due to the fact that sub silentio holdings are of less precedential value than treatment on
the merits and due to other Supreme Court created exceptions to Hawkins, it did not view
Hawkins as controlling in the case. Id.
63. See United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975). The court further
stated: "An 'offense against the other' has been broadly interpreted to include any personal
wrong done to the other, whether physically, mentally or morally injurious." Id.
64. Id. at 1367. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(F) (West 1964); NEB. REV. STAT.
Supp. § 28-1505 (1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-2-1 (1967).
65. See United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1037-39 (9th Cir. 1979) (the court
noted the differing views of various circuits and concluded that the marital privilege should
not be extended to bar a third party witness from testifying about an excited utterance by
one spouse concerning the other spouse).
66. See United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th Cir. 1978) (the court held that
the tapes of extrajudicial statements by the wife, though normally precluded by the anti-
marital facts privilege, could be admitted as the wife was not the testifying witness and she
had been a co-conspirator).
67. United States v. Hicks, 420 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
68. See United States v. Benford, 457 F. Supp. 589, 597-98 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (the court
concluded that when the defendant spouse testified he waived the privilege as to testimony
by his wife on the same subject).
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The various courts examined each case carefully to discover
whether the purpose of preserving family peace could be served in
particular cases by precluding spousal testimony without consent
of the other spouse. If a court decided a marriage was incapable of
benefiting from the privilege, it generally refused to allow the priv-
ilege.6 9 In United States v. Cameron,70 for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that "in spite of the legal existence of the marriage, as a
social fact it had expired. 71
Perhaps another unspoken factor in the Court's decision in
Trammel was that although the Court at one time could piously
wish that the lower courts were significantly successful at recon-
structing faltering marriages, an escalated divorce rate has en-
couraged it to abandon that pretense. 2 Commentators have noted
that in cases in which the anti-marital facts privilege usually arose,
the marital relationship was not often a happy one and was not
likely to survive.78 This factor together with the experience of the
federal courts in recent years provide a firm, socio-logical basis for
understanding the result in Trammel.
Finally, with the exception of spouses who are victims of Mann
Act violations, after Trammel unwilling spouses clearly cannot be
compelled to give adverse testimony.7 4 In Mills v. United States,7 5
it was held that the wife could not be compelled to testify in favor
of her husband even though he had consented and wanted her to
do so. These early cases continue to be authoritative since the
Trammel Court has said that spouses may not be compelled to
69. See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Fisher, 518 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1975). Both courts decided that the marriage would not benefit
from the privilege and therefore refused to let the defendants invoke the privilege.
70. 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. The case-by-case approach had once been condemned by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949), however, because the answer to
the question as to whether the particular marriage is capable of being saved would "arise in
the progress of the trial; it [would have to] be decided at once; and its answer [would]
introduce a collateral inquiry likely to complicate the trial seriously."
72. See generally Comment, 7 CuM. L. REV., supra note 49, at 319.
73. See 33 TuL. L. REV., 884 (1959). This commentator went on to say, "[T]he mere
possibility that the use of this rule will promote domestic harmony does not justify exclu-
sion of spousal testimony when it is certain that useful and sometimes crucial information is
thereby excluded." Id. at 891.
74. See Eisenberg v. United States, 273 F.2d 127, 128 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1959), where the
husband, who was being prosecuted under the Mann Act, did not object to testimony by his
wife, but the wife's attorney did object. The court ordered the wife, who had also been a
victim of her husband's crime, to testify. See also Mills v. United States, 281 F.2d 736, 740
(4th Cir. 1960).
75. 281 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1960).
CASE NOTES
testify.78
As a result of Trammel, the marital evidentiary privilege stands
as follows: the option to testify against the defendant spouse rests
with the witness spouse alone, although the witness spouse cannot
be compelled to testify. The privilege protecting confidential mari-
tal communications remains fully intact, but the Trammel ratio-
nale would seemingly indicate its future erosion as well. 7 The mar-
ital evidentiary privilege has been limited to the point that it is
now similar in scope to the attorney-client or physician-patient
privilege and therefore less likely to obstruct full disclosure of all
relevant evidence. The only key difference is that testifying
spouses have the option not to testify whereas attorneys and physi-
cians do not have this option if the defendant wants them to tes-
tify. The unique and often volatile nature of marital situations
may present special problems in determining the reliabiity of wit-
ness spouses. Voluntariness of the testimony may also be a difficult
issue to determine; pressure from prosecutors or from the defen-
dant spouse may cast doubt on the witness spouse's free will in
exercising the option to testify. At any rate, it will be interesting to
note whether, when, and for what specific reasons the twenty-four
states which retain the consent rule will follow the example of the
federal courts in abolishing the anti-marital facts privilege.
M.J. LORD
76. 100 S. Ct. at 914.
77. The rationale of Trammel, that if a spouse is willing to testify adversely about the
defendant spouse the relationship is beyond repair, could be applied as well to the confiden-
tial communications privilege. Few criminal cases would benefit from such an exception,
however, given the exceptions to this privilege currently in existence. See text accompanying
note 38 supra.
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